YoHoChecko
03-22-2007, 07:41 AM
Stats Behind the Stats:
Moss to the Packers? (Part One)
by
Max Gross
The much rumored trade of Randy Moss to the Green Bay Packers has many critics and supporters. The argument ranges from whether or not Moss still has enough left in the tank to whether he can be happy and motivated in Green Bay to whether a former rival team can embrace him. In a two-part series, the merits of this trade will be examined in two separate phases: on the field and off the field. On the field will discuss the abilities of Moss and the needs of the Packers, while off the field will focus on Moss' attitude, as well as trade and salary compensation required to consummate the deal.
Part One: Randy Moss and the Green Bay Packers On the Field
Before it can be determined if Randy Moss fits with the Packers, it must first be determined what it is that Randy Moss can or can’t do. Due to his admitted disinterest in playing for the Raiders last year, this is a slightly more difficult evaluation than it should be. However, I think that looking at recent seasons, such as 2004 when he was nursing an injury and 2005 when he played for a poor offense in Oakland (but was still reasonably motivated) should be an adequate way of determining his abilities.
In those years, despite extenuating circumstances, Moss was still a threat to catch the long ball. On passes thrown at least 20 yards down the field, Moss had 9 catches and 6 touchdowns in 2004 and 11 catches and 7 touchdowns in 2005. This came on an average of less than 3 (2.6) catchable downfield pass attempts towards Moss per game. Bear in mind that 2005 came after the hamstring injury that “ended” his speed and downfield prowess. It should also be noted that in those two years, only 3 deep passes intended for Moss were intercepted, according to KC Joyner, and he gained 145 yards on downfield pass interference penalties.
Based on these two recent seasons--not on his prime--taking a shot downfield to Moss once per quarter, with 3 of those 4 attempts being reasonably accurate, over the course of a season Moss could add 13 big plays for over 600 yards and 8 or 9 touchdowns to the offense. In addition, there are likely to be 3 big pass interference penalties and only 2 interceptions on those pass attempts. Again, this projection coming from the year he injured his hamstring in Minnesota and the year he played in an anemic offense in Oakland . This shows that Randy Moss can still make plays down the field.
Another of Moss’ strengths has come near the goal line. This is infinitely difficult to judge based on his past two seasons in Oakland . Why? Because based on Randy’s situational stats, Moss was only used in “goal-to-go” situations in 3 games over the past 2 years. This means that the Raiders got limited goal-to-go opportunities, and that when they had them, they preferred to go with a power line-up and took Moss out of the game. In those three games in which Moss lined up, he had only one catch for one TD. This may partially explain his unhappiness in Oakland , because it shows the extent to which he was so badly misused.
However, in his last season in Minnesota , Moss cemented himself as one of the elite red zone threats in the league. In that season, Moss caught 7 TD passes in goal-to-go situations, making use of his excellent hands, leaping ability and body control. Even if some of his physical skills have diminished, that would be unlikely to impact the fact that he is 6’4” and has an excellent feel for locating and snagging the ball in the air.
Finally, over the past 3 seasons, Moss has been at his best on first down. He caught more balls on first down than any other down and also had a higher yards/catch (16.6) and a higher yards after catch average (4.0) on first downs. A healthy 65% of Moss’ first down catches went for either another first down or for a touchdown.
So the above information establishes that Moss is a good target down the field, near the goal line and on first downs. These three areas are his strengths and are all things he does as well as (or better than) most receivers in the NFL. Now it must be examined if these strengths match up with the Packers’ need areas. This section will be much more brief.
The numbers are quite simple. Brett Favre’s QB rating on passes thrown at least 20 yards downfield in 2006 was 40.8. This is the result not only of a poorer completion percentage, but of a hefty amount of interceptions (In 2005, in fact, he threw 15 deep INTs to only 10 TDs, and only 5 of those interceptions were deemed "inaccurate” passes, according to KC Joyner’s numbers). This shows that while Favre is taking risks downfield, his receivers are also losing in jump ball situations.
Furthermore, the Packers finished 31st in the league in red zone efficiency. Switching to smaller, quicker offensive linemen hurts the running game in goal line and short yardage situations, and the team’s starting WRs are 6’0” and 5’11”. They are in serious need of a big target who is adept at making catches in the end zone.
Finally, the Packers were abysmal throwing the ball on first down last season. Favre completed only 52% of his first down passes for 4.9 yards per attempt with far more interceptions than touchdowns—by far his lowest numbers by down. It is unknown if this is an issue with Favre, the play calling, the receivers or some other factor, but it bears mentioning that the Packers' worst down is Moss' best.
These three areas are, in fact, the three biggest chinks in the Packers’ offense last year once the running game got going more. Driver and Jennings both excelled at turning small gains into larger ones (Driver had an 82-yard slant and Jennings a 75-yard hitch); both successfully moved the chains; both caught a lot of passes between the 20s; both worked the middle of the field and found soft spots in zones. However, neither established themselves as a serious deep threat (Driver fared much better), neither were able to find the ball in the end zone and perhaps most importantly (due to Favre's sometimes reckless play), neither is great at challenging for jump balls or preventing interceptions anymore, as Driver’s age impedes his once-great leaping ability and his height comes more into play.
Aside from the strengths and weaknesses of each aligning perfectly, there are some other factors that make Moss and the Packers make sense. For starters, prior to 2006, Moss’ career low in yardage would count as the 2nd best performance by a WR opposite Donald Driver since he took over as a starter five years ago (behind Walker’s 2004 season). Furthermore, the Packers led the league last season in dropped passes in 2006, and Moss has a better drop percentage than Donald Driver over the past three years even including Moss’ problematic 2006 season. The Packers are also severely lacking in receiver depth and currently have no reliable slot receiver. Greg Jennings’ feel for the game and ability to maneuver into open areas make him a perfect fit for that role as he continues to develop into an expanded role.
Randy Moss would instantly become the Packers’ tallest receiver, possess the best hands of their receivers, and likely would still be their fastest receiver (Driver and Jennings are both about 4.45-4.50 guys). He would also specialize in the exact areas in which the Packers’ offense is currently the most deficient. Purely as a football move, adding Randy Moss makes an awful lot of sense.
"Part Two: Off the Field (http://www.pigskinheaven.com/forums/showthread.php?t=56326)" is now posted and discusses the other issues involved in this potential trade
Moss to the Packers? (Part One)
by
Max Gross
The much rumored trade of Randy Moss to the Green Bay Packers has many critics and supporters. The argument ranges from whether or not Moss still has enough left in the tank to whether he can be happy and motivated in Green Bay to whether a former rival team can embrace him. In a two-part series, the merits of this trade will be examined in two separate phases: on the field and off the field. On the field will discuss the abilities of Moss and the needs of the Packers, while off the field will focus on Moss' attitude, as well as trade and salary compensation required to consummate the deal.
Part One: Randy Moss and the Green Bay Packers On the Field
Before it can be determined if Randy Moss fits with the Packers, it must first be determined what it is that Randy Moss can or can’t do. Due to his admitted disinterest in playing for the Raiders last year, this is a slightly more difficult evaluation than it should be. However, I think that looking at recent seasons, such as 2004 when he was nursing an injury and 2005 when he played for a poor offense in Oakland (but was still reasonably motivated) should be an adequate way of determining his abilities.
In those years, despite extenuating circumstances, Moss was still a threat to catch the long ball. On passes thrown at least 20 yards down the field, Moss had 9 catches and 6 touchdowns in 2004 and 11 catches and 7 touchdowns in 2005. This came on an average of less than 3 (2.6) catchable downfield pass attempts towards Moss per game. Bear in mind that 2005 came after the hamstring injury that “ended” his speed and downfield prowess. It should also be noted that in those two years, only 3 deep passes intended for Moss were intercepted, according to KC Joyner, and he gained 145 yards on downfield pass interference penalties.
Based on these two recent seasons--not on his prime--taking a shot downfield to Moss once per quarter, with 3 of those 4 attempts being reasonably accurate, over the course of a season Moss could add 13 big plays for over 600 yards and 8 or 9 touchdowns to the offense. In addition, there are likely to be 3 big pass interference penalties and only 2 interceptions on those pass attempts. Again, this projection coming from the year he injured his hamstring in Minnesota and the year he played in an anemic offense in Oakland . This shows that Randy Moss can still make plays down the field.
Another of Moss’ strengths has come near the goal line. This is infinitely difficult to judge based on his past two seasons in Oakland . Why? Because based on Randy’s situational stats, Moss was only used in “goal-to-go” situations in 3 games over the past 2 years. This means that the Raiders got limited goal-to-go opportunities, and that when they had them, they preferred to go with a power line-up and took Moss out of the game. In those three games in which Moss lined up, he had only one catch for one TD. This may partially explain his unhappiness in Oakland , because it shows the extent to which he was so badly misused.
However, in his last season in Minnesota , Moss cemented himself as one of the elite red zone threats in the league. In that season, Moss caught 7 TD passes in goal-to-go situations, making use of his excellent hands, leaping ability and body control. Even if some of his physical skills have diminished, that would be unlikely to impact the fact that he is 6’4” and has an excellent feel for locating and snagging the ball in the air.
Finally, over the past 3 seasons, Moss has been at his best on first down. He caught more balls on first down than any other down and also had a higher yards/catch (16.6) and a higher yards after catch average (4.0) on first downs. A healthy 65% of Moss’ first down catches went for either another first down or for a touchdown.
So the above information establishes that Moss is a good target down the field, near the goal line and on first downs. These three areas are his strengths and are all things he does as well as (or better than) most receivers in the NFL. Now it must be examined if these strengths match up with the Packers’ need areas. This section will be much more brief.
The numbers are quite simple. Brett Favre’s QB rating on passes thrown at least 20 yards downfield in 2006 was 40.8. This is the result not only of a poorer completion percentage, but of a hefty amount of interceptions (In 2005, in fact, he threw 15 deep INTs to only 10 TDs, and only 5 of those interceptions were deemed "inaccurate” passes, according to KC Joyner’s numbers). This shows that while Favre is taking risks downfield, his receivers are also losing in jump ball situations.
Furthermore, the Packers finished 31st in the league in red zone efficiency. Switching to smaller, quicker offensive linemen hurts the running game in goal line and short yardage situations, and the team’s starting WRs are 6’0” and 5’11”. They are in serious need of a big target who is adept at making catches in the end zone.
Finally, the Packers were abysmal throwing the ball on first down last season. Favre completed only 52% of his first down passes for 4.9 yards per attempt with far more interceptions than touchdowns—by far his lowest numbers by down. It is unknown if this is an issue with Favre, the play calling, the receivers or some other factor, but it bears mentioning that the Packers' worst down is Moss' best.
These three areas are, in fact, the three biggest chinks in the Packers’ offense last year once the running game got going more. Driver and Jennings both excelled at turning small gains into larger ones (Driver had an 82-yard slant and Jennings a 75-yard hitch); both successfully moved the chains; both caught a lot of passes between the 20s; both worked the middle of the field and found soft spots in zones. However, neither established themselves as a serious deep threat (Driver fared much better), neither were able to find the ball in the end zone and perhaps most importantly (due to Favre's sometimes reckless play), neither is great at challenging for jump balls or preventing interceptions anymore, as Driver’s age impedes his once-great leaping ability and his height comes more into play.
Aside from the strengths and weaknesses of each aligning perfectly, there are some other factors that make Moss and the Packers make sense. For starters, prior to 2006, Moss’ career low in yardage would count as the 2nd best performance by a WR opposite Donald Driver since he took over as a starter five years ago (behind Walker’s 2004 season). Furthermore, the Packers led the league last season in dropped passes in 2006, and Moss has a better drop percentage than Donald Driver over the past three years even including Moss’ problematic 2006 season. The Packers are also severely lacking in receiver depth and currently have no reliable slot receiver. Greg Jennings’ feel for the game and ability to maneuver into open areas make him a perfect fit for that role as he continues to develop into an expanded role.
Randy Moss would instantly become the Packers’ tallest receiver, possess the best hands of their receivers, and likely would still be their fastest receiver (Driver and Jennings are both about 4.45-4.50 guys). He would also specialize in the exact areas in which the Packers’ offense is currently the most deficient. Purely as a football move, adding Randy Moss makes an awful lot of sense.
"Part Two: Off the Field (http://www.pigskinheaven.com/forums/showthread.php?t=56326)" is now posted and discusses the other issues involved in this potential trade